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Уругвайская разведка @UrgvRazvedka Война могла закончится на два года раньше, если бы союзники бомбили объекты энергетики Германии. Из открытых документов стало ясно почему этого не делали - большая часть объектов были в руках частных компаний, капитал для их оборудования был предоставлен банками Нью-Йорка.. Miles Too 0> Baltic Sea North Sea jT.Heidp' II ‘Rostock ' ЩИ I у Peenemünde ^ Lübeck AnklamTlT —* / 'Schwerin . . 'BrcmerhavenA^roburg ШШ Emden ^ , / TSrCi 7^) Fighter Escort Range - ' July 1943-Feb. 194,4' 'Stettin / ; Av Fighter Escort Range & Dire. 1942-July 1943 Dafmund Hanover. ■РГЩ|) ?ötsdam* Brunswick J|0 ^Ma^iieburg Oschersleben.-J- bessauTj" / ИаиМд Merseberg»®^® ||^ •Berlin «6 Ruhland .^•Leipzig ^J| J * »Leipzig ■■III fija «Wanne-Eickel Gotha*4- Erfüll Ç|Q*Lutzkend - и f aa. .Che mint Giessen M Jjd\ ^Franklurt mp ’ S t®-ze¡u4^em™3-' . J ее Brüx« >\Jf ^Wiesbaden mai lu. ' V J| , BR (.Mannheim ^Saarbrücken*®?® . Ludwigshafen / •• л/ Brüx. Schweínfurt Fighter Escort Range J Fei. 1944-June 1944 rih. ||*JI gjj * Nürnberg Fürth / »Prague \ CZECHOSLOVAKIA s \ FRANCE 'Stuttgart mJ|,ulm "t^Augsburg. . —** The Air Campaign against Germany ?y ^ worn * * Regensburg 0-, A ^ Aircraft Industry ’M War Industry 'Munich tv* Marshalling Yards «L cc Oil Industry i Ji Sub Pens/Base у Missile Test Site At least one other American targeting organization in Europe addressed the possibility of attacking electrical power—the Enemy Objectives Unit (EOU). As part of the Economic Warfare Division in the US Embassy, this unit was assigned the task of formulating criteria for target selection and then applying them to different target systems. Such a process would, theoretically, produce the best targets to attack.46 The methodology developed by the EOU was based on the premise that targets would be "chosen in light of an explicitly defined military aim, linked to the full context of war strategy.' The members of the unit opposed attacks designed to weaken the economy or 21 to affect morale,47 and instead concentrated on the impact bombing would have on the German military capability.48 The EOU Handbook specifically states, "The target systems in this Handbook have been selected on the basis of their direct military effects only."49 While this organization operated autonomously from Eighth Air Force, much of the target analysis was used by the Eighth in its efforts to prioritize targets. Electric power was rejected on general principle by the EOU analysts because attacking it would not lead to "an early reduction in military strength disposable in the field.”50 Electric power was also rejected for three specific assumptions. Contrary to the COA, the EOU felt that the targets were dispersed in "extraordinarily small" units and they postulated that ”23 [of the] largest stations produce only 20 percent of German output.”51 However, they agreed with the COA findings regarding the grid system's flexibility which minimized the effectiveness of any attack.52 Finally, die EOU felt that "installations in power plants and switching stations are of such a kind as to require bombing of the highest concentration and precision,"53 a level of precision they obviously felt was beyond the capability of Eighth Air Force. The planning for World War II offers a good illustration of the problems involved with gathering appropriate intelligence. Prior to the war there was a severe organizational deficiency. General Arnold commented after the war that "looking back on it, I think one of the most wasteful weaknesses in our whole setup was our lack of a proper Air Intelligence Organization.” He continued, "Our target intelligence, the ultimate determinant, the compass on which all the priorities of our strategic bombardment campaign against Ger- 45 many would depend, was set up only after we were actually at war.”2 Most of the information that was collected by the Air Intelligence section prior to the war was obtained through the New York banks, who had provided the capital for most of the equipment, and the British intelligence agencies.3 Much of this intelligence, however, was on the supply side of the problem: data such as the number of power plants, electrical capacity available versus the amount used, and the flexibility of the German grid system. What the air planners lacked was information on the effects of the bombing of electric power and an analytical approach that justified attacking this system.4 This created difficulties because, while the air planners shared common assumptions about how bombing electric power would lead to the capitulation of Germany, they were unable to either express or convince others of this vision.
Я Ватник,# я ватник, ,фэндомы,Ватные вбросы,ватные вбросы, ватная аналитика, пандориум,,разная политота
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Роммель, ну, тут концентрация твоего говноедства уже начинает зашкаливать. Майское солнышко в голову ударило? Моча в зенках вскипела?
Похоже ты сам на солнышке перегрелся - предъявы за перепост какие то детские)
Ты говоришь Роммикса, как буд-то он афтар твита - а не трать, сделавший пост согласно тематике фендома)
Как то глупо, не?)
Ты говнишь уже с переходом на его - лично.
Ты высказал свое имхо - все.
Тематика фендома - явно не та, что в глагне политоты и сале. Если ты ищешь говно - то по запаху тебе там будет много как приятно)
Да, я говню говнопостера. Который ворует посты, дублит свои же посты, постит говно, постит откровенный пиздеж.
Тематика не та, а говна на мою страну тут выливается гораздо больше. Удивительно.
Манера постинга у каждого своя - если почитать обсуждение в твите - наверняка там и пруфы со ссылками будут)
Сноуден не борец за свободу и правду?
Этодругин опять, штоле, употребляешь?)
Как гражданин РФ я бы осуждал аналогичных деятелей из моей страны, но тут беда. У нас то выебут уже по истечению срока годности тайны, то не рассказывают, в чем вина даже подсудимому в нарушение Конституции. И тут закрадываются подозрения.
Середина в этом - возможна?)
Но дело не в отношении к Сноудену, а в том, что Роммель пиздит и пиздит часто. Либо он мудак, либо долбоеб. На что ставишь?
Ну-ну.